Recognition and Redistribution:
Finding Common Ground between Two Conceptions of Freedom

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One of Axel Honneth's central claims is that scholars too often draft their moral-political theories without sufficient treatment of the role played by intersubjectively developed social norms. This recognition approach to freedom, however, is often criticized for its subordination of redistributive justice claims to feelings of disrespect. In this article, I defend Honneth's general claims by explicating how specific policies for distributive justice can be closely imbricated, even mutually reinforcing, with Honneth's broader criteria of justification through mutually recognized social norms. I use Martha Nussbaum's conception of freedom as capability and Philip Pettit's theory of freedom as non-domination as two examples for how recognition and distributive justice are closely linked. *[Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2017 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]*

KEYWORDS: Honneth, Recognition, Non-Domination, Capabilities, Redistribution, Freedom, Justice.

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